Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 2

Article 5

2013

Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law:
1983-2013
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rapp, Geoffrey Christopher (2013) "Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013," Hofstra Labor and Employment Law
Journal: Vol. 30: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss2/5

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Rapp: Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013

FOUR SIGNAL MOMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW: 1983-2013
By Geoffrey ChristopherRapp*

Consumer activist Ralph Nader is sometimes credited with having
coined the term "Whistle Blower" in the early 1970s.1 In the decades
since, much has changed. The term lost one space - becoming
"whistleblower" 2 - but came to occupy a new space in the public's
understanding of the best ways to root out fraud and criminality in a
wide range of activities and organizations. Whistleblowers helped end a
war3 and bring down a United States President;4 changed the landscape
of environmental protection;5 exposed fraudulent practices at tobacco
companies;6 and, in more recent memory, highlighted patterns of fraud
in publicly traded companies7 and helped destroy one of America's most
beloved sports icons, cyclist Lance Armstrong.
The legal landscape relating to whistleblowers has changed
dramatically as well. In 1983, the Supreme Court dismissively made

* Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.
1. See WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972). Other sources identify earlier uses of the term,
See Dave Wilton, Whistleblower,
such as in a 1958 article in an Ohio newspaper.
WORDORIGINS.ORG (Feb. 18, 2007), http://www.wordorigins.org/index.php/site/whistleblower/.
2. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 1896 (2011).
3. See Steven Duin, Daniel Ellsberg- The Nation's Pre-eminent Whistleblower - Will be in
(Mar.
31,
2010,
5:05
PM),
Documentary,
OREGONLIVE
Portland with
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/steveduin/index.ssf/2010/03/danielellsberg_the nations.html.
4. See Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the
New Era ofDodd-FrankAct "Bounty Hunting",45 CONN. L. REV. 481,491 (2012).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD RASHKE, THE KILLING OF KAREN SILKWOOD 5 (1981).
6. See Wigand: 60 Minutes' Most Famous Whistleblower, CBS NEWS (Aug. 21, 2011, 6:56
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504803_162-20094836-10391709.html.
7. See Bob Ivry, Woman Who Couldn't be Intimidated by Citigroup Wins $31 Million,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/woman-who-couldn-tbe-intimidated-by-citigroup-wins-3 1-million.html.
8. Joseph Ax, DopingAdmission Could Cost Armstrong Millions -Lawyers, REUTERS (Jan.
18,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-cycling-armstrong-legalidUSBRE90HO8020130118.
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reference to "so-called 'whistleblowers."' 9 In the years since, however,
the whistleblower has been elevated to a far more prominent position. A
whistleblower is typically (though not exclusively) an employee of a
corporation, government agency, or educational institution, who comes
into possession of information on an ongoing criminal, fraudulent,
unsafe or otherwise questionable practice.' 0 The whistleblower reports
information or makes allegations, sometimes to external regulators,
watchdog groups, or the media, and sometimes internally (though often
outside of the chain of command)." From the beginning of the practice
we now call whistleblowing such employees have faced retaliation - the
threat of which, along with other incentives, favored remaining silent.' 2
The law, thankfully, has evolved to provide both protection and positive
incentives for whistleblowers.' 3
This Article identifies four signal legal changes in the treatment of
whistleblowers that have helped propel those who speak out into their
current prominent role in policy discussions. The first moment was the
passage of amendments, in 1986, to the Federal False Claims Act
These amendments created a structure by which
(FCA).14
whistleblowers in the federal procurement context could claim a share of
recovered funds connected with fraud perpetrated against the
government.' 5 Importantly, the FCA amendments gave whistleblowers
increased control over litigation involving fraud against the
government.' 6 In addition to helping the government recover large sums
of money, the 1986 FCA amendments provided financial resources to an
emerging plaintiffs whistleblower bar.' 7 The lawyers who got rich
using the newly strengthened FCA provisions became a powerful force
for policy advocacy in contexts outside of the somewhat narrow purview
of the FCA.'
9. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 n.25 (1983) (emphasis added).
10. See Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov't Sponsored
Enters. ofthe H Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 58 (2011) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals]
(statement of Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Professor of Law, Univ. of Toledo College of Law).
11. See id

12.

See id. at 58-59.

13. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (providing increased protections to whistleblowers
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
16. See Joseph M. Makalusky, Blowing the Whistle on the Need to Clarni and Correct the
Massachusetts False Claims Act, 94 MASS. L. REv. 41, 45-46 (2012).
17. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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The second signal moment for whistleblower law was the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20029 (SOX), which, for the first time,
provided seemingly uniform protections for whistleblowers who raised
concerns about accounting fraud in publicly held companies. 2 0 Although
many scholars have deemed SOX's whistleblowing provisions
ineffective, the statute itself represented an important shift in national
thinking about the best ways to uncover financial fraud.2'
Whistleblowers, long second fiddle to private securities lawsuits, came
to be recognized as an important avenue for detecting fraud.
The third signal moment was perhaps the least noticed. In a section
of the Deficit Recovery Act of 2005 (DRA),22 the federal government
deployed a rather novel carrot for stimulating state law change. The
DRA gave states that enacted their own false claims acts a significant
windfall in terms of their split of recoveries in federal False Claims Act
cases involving joint state-federal Medicaid expenditures. 23 As a result,
in just a few short years, the number of states with such statutes rapidly
increased, and state false claims acts have been a hot area of litigation in
the ensuing time.24
Finally, in reaction to the financial market meltdown of 2008-2009,
Congress imported the FCA's bounty model for stimulating
whistleblowers to the SOX context, 25 as a number of scholars, including
Although Dodd-Frank's
myself, had argued was needed. 26
whistleblower provision, like SOX's before it, suffers from important
limitations, it represents a major shift in direction toward empowering
and incentivizing whistleblowers in the financial arena.
After discussing each of these signal moments, I speculate about
the future of whistleblower law. Important questions remain to be
19. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
20. See Vega, supra note 4, at 493.
21. See Paul Sweeney, Sarbanes-Oxley - A Decade Later, FIN. EXECUTIVES INT'L (2012),
http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/Financial-ExecutiveMagazine/2012_07/Sarbanes-Oxley-A-Decade-Later.aspx#axzz2QZ5Bal6A.
22. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
23. See Kirsten V. Mayer et al., American Bar Association's Eighth Annual National
Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement, State False Claims Laws and
Compliance with the DRA: What is Required After FERA and PPACA?, 1-45 (2010), available at
http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/95a2a983-d350-42ee-9fcl7cc28709f938/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/53217857-8554-497f-87e77e9ea8eOba0e/statefalseclaims.pdf.
24. See id.
25. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
26. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 116-18
(2007) [hereinafter Rapp, Beyond Protection].
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answered. Will Congress respond to Dodd-Frank's invitation to
consider allowing securities whistleblowers, like FCA plaintiffs, to
pursue an action on their own? Will companies adjust their historical
reluctance to whistleblowing and begin to implement their own internal
whistleblower reward systems? Will protection for whistleblowers on
the federal and state level help stimulate changes in the common law's
treatment of whistleblowers, which may have lagged behind? Only time
will tell, but one thing is certain: the prominence of whistleblowers, for
better or for worse, is here to stay.
I. THE 1986 FCA AMENDMENTS
The federal FCA dates back to the Civil War,27 but it remained a
largely ineffectual tool for much of its history thanks to restrictive court
decisions.2 8 During the height of the Cold War, chicanery on the part of
defense contractors captured congressional attention. 29 The result was a
statutory reform that transformed the role of whistleblowers as deputies
for enforcing federal claims.3 0
Prior to the adoption of the 1986 amendments, an employee of a
defense contractor with information about ongoing fraud faced
significant threats to her career were she to choose to bring such
information to the attention of federal procurement or law enforcement
authorities.31 There was little effective incentive, moreover, for an
employee to step forward.32
The 1986 amendments began the revolution in whistleblower
reward and incentive laws. First, through its 1986 amendments,
Congress made whistleblower bounties mandatory, whereas previously
they had been discretionary. 3 Anti-retaliation provisions were adopted,
which provided a "much needed" change giving employees the right to
bring suit against employers who retaliate, demote, or otherwise
27. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessingthe PrivateAttorney General:Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1270 (2012).
28. See id at 1270-71, 1274.
29. This was the era of the '"$600 toilet seats"' and the "'$7000 coffeepots."' Sean Elameto,
Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act,
41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 818 (2012) (quoting Barry M. Landy, Note, DeterringFraudto Increase
Public Confidence: Why Congress Should Allow Government Employees to File Qui Tam Lawsuits,
94 MINN. L. REv. 1239, 1239 (2010)).
30. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
COHEN
LLP,
Act
History,
PHILLIPS
&
31. See
False
Claims
http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/False-Claims-Act-History/ (last visited May 12, 2013).
32. Elameto, supra note 29, at 818.
33. See Makalusky, supra note 16, at 45-46.
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discriminate against an employee for bringing fraud to light.34 The
damages provision was modified from double to treble damages.
Furthermore, the statutory fine was doubled, and an attorneys' fees and
costs provision was added. 6 Perhaps most importantly, the statute's
jurisdictional "public disclosure" bar was modified. Prior to the 1986
amendments, courts could not consider any FCA lawsuits based on
information already in the government's possession;38 under the
amendments, only a lawsuit "based upon the public disclosure" would
be subject to a jurisdictional bar,39 and then only if the plaintiff were not
the "original source" of the information.4 0
Collectively, these were "sweeping changes."41 The result of the
1986 amendments was a rapid expansion of the use of qui tam suits to
enforce the federal FCA.42 Qui tam recoveries have come to eclipse
recoveries in other areas of law, including securities and antitrust.4 3
The 1986 amendments did include some checks, such as the
modified public disclosure bar" and a restriction on lawsuits by
members of the military and veterans,45 but those limitations did not
prevent the statute from proving to be an adaptable and broad sword in
the battle against fraud perpetrated on taxpayers. The most common use
of qui tam suits includes both the defense fraud context that prompted
the 1986 amendments and fraud in connection with federally funded
healthcare programs - Medicaid and Medicare.46 However, qui tam
litigation has been brought in a wide variety of other areas.4 7
Perhaps the most important consequence of the 1986 amendments
is that they helped to create an "increasingly sophisticated and specialize
qui tam relators' bar" - with dozens of law firms and hundreds of

34. Id at 46.
35. Elameto, supra note 29, at 819.
36. See Makalusky, supranote 16, at 46.
37. See id. at 45.
38. Id.
39. 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4)(A) (1986).
40. § 3730(3)(4)(B).
41. Makalusky, supra note 16, at 45.
42. Engstrom, supra note 27, at 1270 ("qui tam filings have exploded from a few dozen
lawsuits in 1987 to more than 600 in 2011").
43. Id. at 1270-71.
44. See Beverly Cohen, KABOOM! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Acts Under the
Health Reform Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REv. 77,86-87 (2011).
45. See Makalusky, supranote 16, at 45.
46. Engstrom, supra note 27, at 1271.
47. Id. (listing other common claims such as frauds in connection with federal research grants
and Hurricane Katrina relief).
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lawyers focusing on whistleblower litigation.4 8 Victories by these
lawyers helped to fund4 9 a collection of whistleblower advocacy groups
that have successfully lobbied not just for plaintiff-friendly changes in
the FCA, but also for the adoption of whistleblower bounty and reward
programs in other contexts.50 For instance, Taxpayers Against Fraud
(TAF) serves as an educational, policy, and lobbying organization
funded and supported by successful whistleblower lawyers.s'
The role of attorneys in shaping policy is just one of the ways in
which lawyers have helped to change the perception of whistleblowers
and their role in public debates. Lawyers have also proven to be
important translators of whistleblower experiences. Whistleblowers,
whether due to preexisting tendencieS52 or the traumatic experiences they
have undergone since bringing fraud to light, can often make their
audiences uncomfortable - they worry about crying in public, and
talking like their "hair is on fire."53 Lawyers, removed from the
emotional trauma and pain of a whistleblower's experience, are perhaps
more likely to be taken seriously. The FCA amendments helped
cultivate and groom a generation of whistleblower lawyers who today
stand beside those who bring fraud to light and help communicate
whistleblowers' experiences.
II. SOX'S WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS - A SYMBOLIC VICTORY

SOX was enacted in 2002 as a response to financial scandals at
Enron and WorldCom. 54 SOX included a laundry list of corporate
governance and financial regulation reforms.ss Among them was a
provision protecting employees from retaliation for reporting violations
of the federal securities laws. 6 Prior to SOX, an employee of a
company subject to the federal laws who brought a violation of those
48. Id. at 1281; see also Elameto, supra note 29, at 815.
49. Qui tam relators reaped nearly three billion in relator awards between 1986 and 2010.
Elameto, supranote 29, at 844.
50. See Who We Are, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, http://www.taforg/whowe-are (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
51. See id.
52. Fred Alford describes the motivation for whistleblowers as "narcissism moralized,"
recognizing though intending potential insult. C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN
LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 63 (2001).
53. Id at ix.
54. See Sarah L. Reid & Serena B. David, The Evolution of the SEC Whistleblower: From
Sarbanes-Oxleyto Dodd-Frank, 129 BANKING L.J. 907,908 (2012).
55. For example, section 301 establishes complaint procedures at covered companies. See id.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006).
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laws to the attention of internal superiors or external regulators would
likely have been terminated with little legal protection.57
Section 806 of the statute prohibits covered employers from
retaliating against whistleblowers who report violation of any federal
law relating to shareholders, including rules and regulations promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Section 301 of
SOX required all companies to establish procedures to receive and
process complaints.
These two sections create SOX's dual
mechanisms for fostering whistleblowing - a traditional anti-retaliation
provision and what Richard Moberly calls a "structural" whistleblower
policy designed to promote the revelation of fraud by improving the
procedures by which tips and complaints would be processed.o
Industry was concerned that SOX would produce "a floodgate of
complaints," though this concern proved not to be legitimate. 6 1 The Act
may have failed to produce an unwieldy volume of complaints due to its
limitations and the restrictive way it has been interpreted. The federal
administrative agency responsible for evaluating SOX claims - OSHA was reluctant to find for complainants, overburdened by the scope of its
new mandate, and bereft of the new resources needed to do its job.62
Narrow interpretations of key statutory provisions further limited the
statute's reach.6 3
In addition, a disconnect persisted between the agency enforcing
SOX - OSHA - and the anti-financial fraud policy objective behind the

statute. Amazingly, there apparently was not even a single instance in
which an OSHA complaint prompted an SEC investigation. 4 Whether
that is due to the low quality or stale nature of tips, or to bureaucratic
wrangling, is unclear. The SEC indicated that, during the time between
SOX and Dodd-Frank, it expected to leave responsibility for
whistleblower tips to OSHA, 65 even though that agency had no authority
to enforce violations of the securities laws. The bottom line is, whether
57. Sarbanes-Oxley provides whistleblowers receive "all relief necessary to make the
employee whole," including reinstatement and back pay. § 1514A(c).
58. § 1514A.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-(1).
60. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley 's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64
S.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012).
61. Reid & David, supra note 54, at 908-09.
62. See Moberly, supranote 60, at 32.
63. See id
64. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-FrankAct, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 126 (2012)
[hereinafter Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties?].
65. See id.
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or not SOX provided meaningful protection for workers, it utterly failed
to promote financial fraud whistleblowing in ways that facilitated timely
and meaningful governmental intervention.
In spite of its limited actual benefit to terminated employees, SOX
stands as a moment of great symbolic importance. Without SOX - and
persistent evidence of its ineffectiveness, at least relative to the
successful FCA 6 6 - there would not have been Dodd-Frank. SOX
symbolized an expansion of federal whistleblower policy outside of the
narrow areas - procurement fraud, nuclear safety, insider trading, and
the like - to which it had previously been confined.67 Because of its
symbolic force, SOX provided a roadmap and "model for subsequent
legal measures that encourage and protect whistleblowers." 68 Richard
Moberly identifies nine new whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions
adopted in the ten years following SOX. 69
III. THE DRA's SILENT STIMULUS FOR STATE-LAW CHANGE

The third signal moment in whistleblower law is the one that has
received the least attention from scholars and at the national
policymaking level. The Deficit Recovery Act of 2005 (DRA}actually enacted in 2006-established that any state with its own false
claims law as strong as the general version would enjoy a larger share of
any recovery in a Medicaid fraud lawsuit. 70 This "dangl[ed] carrots"n in
front of the states, creating a strong incentive for them to adopt
significant changes to bring their statutes in line with the federal
approach.7 2 The passage of the DRA meant that any states without false
claims laws would enact them.73
The results have been striking. Prior to the enactment of the DRA,
only nineteen states had false claims laws, and only thirteen of those
included a qui tam provision, giving a whistleblower the right to sue in

66. See Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-FrankAct's Robust Whistleblowing Incentives, FORBES
(Apr. 14, 2011, 9:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/04/14/the-dodd-frankacts-robust-whistleblowing-incentives/.
67. See Moberly, supra note 60, at 7.

68.

See id. at 4.

69.
70.
71.

See id. at 12 & n.65.
42 U.S.C. § 1396(h) (2006).
Makalusky, supranote 16, at 57.

72.

See id.

73. See Michael J. Davidson, VFA TA: Virginia's False Claims Act, 3 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 1,
4(2009).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss2/5

8

Rapp: Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013
2013]

WHISTLEBLOWER LAW

397

the name of the government.74 By three years after the DRA's passage,
the number of states with false claims acts was up to twenty-four75 and
just three years after that it was up to a whopping forty. 76 While some of
these state laws are limited to the health care or Medicaid context, a
number of them have a broader reach.77
These changes create a whole new area of whistleblower bounty
law for courts to develop and for legislatures to continue to tweak. It
also represents an interesting form of competitive federalism. Instead of
letting the "laboratory" of states decide whether to have a law and what
form the law would take, the federal authorities have created a strong
incentive for the adoption of a baseline law meeting the federal
Beyond that, however, states will be free to experiment;
standards.
having laws on the books for the first time in most cases, they are in a
position to help answer important questions about the effectiveness of
whistleblower rewards, particularly in the health care sector.
IV. DODD-FRANK'S CAUTIOUS EMBRACE OF BOUNTY AWARDS

Prior to Dodd-Frank, federal financial regulators had a dismissive
approach toward whistleblowers-even where limited statutory avenues
existed (as in the case of insider trading)-for providing bounties to
tipsters.80 This was unfortunate, for whistleblower revelations had the
potential to do a much better job than private securities litigation in
bringing ongoing, serious fraud to light at a time when it could be
addressed and corrected at a reduced social cost.8 1 Financial industry
employee-whistleblowers are likely to be sophisticated, particularly
receptive to financial incentives, and were thus an ideal candidates for
the adoption of whistleblower bounty schemes.82
Dodd-Frank expanded bounties beyond the world of fraud against
the government; "fraud against private investors or the financial

74. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, States of Pay - Emerging Trends in State Whistleblower
Bounty Schemes, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 53, 61 (2012).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id at 75-79.
78. See supranotes 70-72 and accompanying text.
79. See Rapp, Beyond Protection,supra note 26, at 139-40.
80. See Reid & David, supra note 54, at 910.
81. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate
Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 55, 61 (2009-2010).
82. See id
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markets" could now trigger a bounty reward.83 In addition, Dodd-Frank
extended the protection provided by SOX to a broader range of potential
tipsters. 84 In general, Dodd-Frank took a broad approach to defining
eligible whistleblowers.s
Under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower who reports violations of the
federal securities laws to the SEC could earn a bounty in any case where
the SEC obtains a $1 million fine or sanction against a wrongdoer.
However, unlike under the FCA, whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank
lacked standing to pursue fraud allegations in the absence of government
8
intervention 87 - an omission which may prove significant.
The most controversial aspect of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provisions is likely its failure to mandate, as a condition for bounty
eligibility, internal reporting prior to bringing fraud to the government's
attention. 9 Scholars have questioned whether this undermines the
whistleblower program in a moral sense, 90 and businesses have objected
to the effect that they perceive Dodd-Frank will have on their internal
corporate compliance regimes, built at great cost in the aftermath of
SOX.91

Professor Matt Vega argues that Dodd-Frank's preference for
external reporting renders the provision morally suspect-that it forces
whistleblowers to choose between doing the "right thing" by blowing the
whistle internally, and doing the "profit-maximizing thing" by going
straight to the government. 9 2
While I am sympathetic to the general feeling that undercutting
internal compliance structures should not be a policy goal, I find some of
these objections overblown. 93 First, there is no indication that, even
after Dodd-Frank, employees will utterly abandon internal
whistleblowing programs. Most employees report fraud as part of a
desire to protect their employer and they will likely choose internal
83. Reid & David, supranote 54, at 910.
84. See id at 911.
85. See id. (stating that individuals engaged in compliance, internal audit, human resource or
public accounting could all qualify as whistleblowers).
86. Moberly, supra note 60, at 47.
87. Id.
88. See Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties?, supranote 64, at 133-42.
89. See Vega, supranote 4, at 485.
90. See id at 485-86.
91. See id. at 499-500.
92. See id at 484 (describing this "Hobson's choice").
93. 1have also argued that SOX's anti-retaliation and structural approach may have favored
internal as opposed to external whistleblowing to an unwarranted degree. See Rapp, Beyond
Protection, supra note 26, at 126.
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routes for that reason,94 even if it runs against their financial selfinterest.
Second, Dodd-Frank may counterintuitively have a positive effect
on internal corporate compliance by introducing competitive pressure.
Internal programs will need to adjust to appear to potential employees to
be a better way to report concerns. Companies may go beyond adopting
a "we won't punish you" approach to whistleblowers and instead
embrace an approach of rewardingthose who bring fraud or other abuse
to light via internal channels.
Third, any mandate of internal reporting would be problematic in
those instances where a dedicated fraudster has both perpetrated a
financial scheme and has the power or leverage to control the outcome
of a whistleblower's internal complaints. The typical solution is to craft
an escape clause from an internal reporting mandate for circumstances in
which the person who would receive the report is the wrongdoer, or the
whistleblower believes the person receiving the report would be
conflicted.9 6 The problem is that there is simply too great a danger that
whistleblowing will be chilled due to uncertainty surrounding whether
such an exemption applies.97
As to Professor Vega's objections based on natural law theory and
perfectionism, I am afraid we may just be approaching the topic from
fundamentally divergent starting points. The proposal I advanced in
Beyond Protection in 2007 was squarely instrumental and pragmatic.98
Whistleblowers were embraced as leverage to achieve securities fraud
deterrence in a more effective way and at a lower social cost than private
securities litigation.99 To me, the proposal to reward tipsters has always
been more about investor protection through deterrence than it has been
about the moral dimension of the act of whistleblowing 00 If forced to
argue the issue along moral lines, I would offer the following defense of
bounty rewards: one must, in the financial fraud context, consider their
moral effects relative to other methods of fraud detection (such as

94. Legislative Proposals,supra note 10, at 60.
95. See id Given the holes in the Dodd-Frank program, in particular its one million dollar
fine limitation, it may be that the SEC only rarely pays out whistleblower rewards and, for the vast
majority of potential tipsters discovering fraud at its early stages, it is financially better to keep
things within the confines of one's firm.
96. See id (discussing the high-level management and bad-faith exceptions).
97. Id.
98. See generally Rapp, Beyond Protection,supra note 26 (arguing that significant bounties
would outweigh drawbacks of whistleblowing).
99. See id at 97.
100. See Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties?, supra note 64, at 123.
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parasitic securities fraud claims).
Dodd-Frank's most immediate meaningful impact may not have
been in changing the calculus for whistleblowers, but instead in spurring
the SEC to respond to whistleblower information. In response to DoddFrank the SEC created new offices to respond to the predicted influx of
whistleblower tips.'0o
Previous experience gives reason to be suspicious of the SEC's
enthusiasm for embracing whistleblower reports.102 The SEC long had
authority to pay bounties in insider trading cases, yet it only rarely
exercised that authority.' 03 More strikingly, in one recent case that
produced an SEC Office of Inspector General report, an SEC
enforcement attorney revealed a whistleblower's identity to the tipster's

employer.104
After the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the SEC, which had previously
processed tips through its Enforcement Division and regional offices,
created a dedicated central Office of the Whistleblower to handle and
investigate tips.1os For the first time, there would be attorneys in the
Enforcement Division evaluated not for the number of cases filed or the
number of cease-and-desist settlements obtained, but instead for how
they treated and responded to whistleblower claims. In addition, the
SEC created an Office of Market Intelligence to develop technologies
and systems for processing tips and complaints.1 06
While the long-term impact of the statute remains to be determined,
it is fair to say that even now, as a result of Dodd-Frank, "whistleblower
regimes [have become] central to the regulation of the financial services
industry, and. . . will be increasingly utilized."' 7 As was the case with
the FCA, one of the mechanisms by which Dodd-Frank will matter
likely has to do with attorneys, who, surprisingly, like to get paid.
Dodd-Frank creates "powerful incentives for whistleblowers, and more
importantly, their counsel, to report wrongdoing." 08
101. Moberly, supra note 60, at 52.
102. See id at 51.
103. See Rapp, Beyond Protection, supra note 26, at 117.
104. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties?, supra note 64, at 127.
105. Moberly, supra note 60, at 52.
106. See Bruce Carton, Details Emerge on SEC Office of Market Intelligence, SEC. DOCKET
(Feb. 9, 2010, 7:24 PM), http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/02/09/details-emerge-on-secoffice-of-market-intelligence/.
107. Reid & David, supra note 54, at 907.
108. David M. Becker, What More Can be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1887 (2012). In a somewhat curious argument for a law student to
make, one recent author suggested that the problem associated with Dodd-Frank's incentive system
is that it is more likely that whistleblowers will be represented by counsel. See Jessica Luhrs, Note,
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V. CONCLUSION

What do the next three decades hold for whistleblower litigation?
Only time will tell.
Doubtless, the defense bar and its corporate clients will continue to
argue for restrictions to curb perceived excesses in existing
whistleblower reward and incentive schemes. 109 Even before the DoddFrank rulemaking process was complete, legislators were proposing
rollbacks to the whistleblower provisions of the statute. 10
There remain a number of doctrinal issues surrounding qui tam
litigation that courts will likely resolve. For instance, do employees
violate their fiduciary duties to an employer when they bring qui tam
actions rather than inform an employer that they have discovered
fraud?"' Should some sort of affirmative defense be crafted based on
the effectiveness of corporate compliance programs?112
One thing that may happen as Dodd-Frank incentivizes blowing the
whistle and being persistent in reporting corporate fraud is that
corporations may slowly come to see the value of whistleblowers. The
business lobby has displayed a seemingly instinctive antipathy for
However, as more whistleblowers reveal
bounty programs." 3
information in time for companies to avert the sometimes devastating
consequences of financial fraud, we might come to see the business
community adopt a different attitude towards whistleblowing.
Corporate actors expressed deep concern that Dodd-Frank's
financial incentives would encourage employees to go first to external
regulators with information about fraud rather than report internally, in
ways that would decimate the "structural" programs companies had
adopted at great expense in the wake of SOX.114 I am skeptical of
whether that will really be the case in regard to meritorious
whistleblowers, in that they tend to blow the whistle not for financial
Encouraging Litigation: Why Dodd-Frank Goes too Far in Eliminating the Procedural Difficulties
in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 182 (2012) (lamenting that whistleblowers unable to
afford counsel will, thanks to Dodd-Frank, be more likely to have a lawyer, leading to the filing of
many more claims, some of which are meritless).
109. See Becker, supra note 108, at 1860, 1864, 1885.
110. Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties?, supra note 64, at 101-02.
111. See, e.g., Enter. Recovery Sys. v. Salmeron, 927 N.E.2d 852, 860 (111.App. Ct. 2010); see
also Rapp, Beyond Protetion, supra note 26, at 125-26.
112. See Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an Affirmative
Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REv. 41, 43 (2012).
113. See Ashby Jones, For Whistleblower Fans, A Grimm Proposal, WALL ST. J. (May 5,
2011, 4:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/05/for-whistleblower-fans-a-grimm-proposal/.
114. See Narine, supra note 112, at 68-69.
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reasons but out of concern for their organization (which would favor
internal, rather than external, reporting).
But even if it turns out that employees skip internal options to go to
the federal authorities, there is an easy fix for concerned businessesadopt an internal whistleblowing reward system. Companies pay
bonuses for all sorts of things, including fresh ideas, long hours, lengthy
careers. Providing bonuses is a way of communicating what a firm
values. If a firm values internal whistleblowing, it should create a
reward system. Report a fraud? Get a bonus. There is no reason in law
why a firm could not adopt such a system.
There are two other trends to watch. The first is on-line
whistleblowing. The web site WikiLeaks is now well known, thanks to
its disclosure of countless classified documents from the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars." 5 The site has been bogged down in internal disputes
and legal wrangling concerning its founder's various legal troubles, and
a number of copycat sites have now foundered.116 Web portals for the
revelation of confidential information offer a way for whistleblowers to
raise concerns publicly yet-at least in theory-remain anonymous. As
programming continues to evolve, automated systems may be able to
aggregate, synthesize, and discriminate among tips forwarded through
online systems. What this raises is the possibility that a whistleblower's
tips (if credible and confirmed) could garner significant attention
without the whistleblower having to ever identify themselvessomething impossible in a "brick and mortar" whistleblowing world.
Secure online document uploading systems (in which a person
providing the document cannot be traced) are likely to soon go
mainstream, raising the profile of online whistleblowing. Al Jazeera, for
instance, now offers a "Transparency Unit" which allows tipsters to
upload such information.'"' There are reports that the Washington Post
and the New York Times are considering developing such systems as
well."'

115. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Cables Depict Afghan Graft, Starting at Top, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/world/asia/03wikileaks2010),
corruption.html?pagewanted=1&ref=global-home&r=-0.
116. Micah L. Sifty, As WikiLeaks Struggles, Copycats Die but Online Whistle-Blowing
Thrives, TECH PRESIDENT (May 29, 2012), http://techpresident.com/news/22253/wikileaksstruggles-copycats-die-online-whistle-blowing-thrives.
117. About the Transparency Unit, AL JAZEERA, http://thepalestinepapers.com/en/aboutus/
(last visited May 13, 2013).
118. Rainey Reitman, Will the Rise of Wikileaks Competitors Make Whistleblowing Resistant
to
Censorship?,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOuND.
(Feb.
16,
2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/02/will-rise-wikileaks-competitors-make.
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At the same time, the existence of such sites exposes a
whistleblower's targets to allegations from unidentified sources that he
may never be able to disprove. We can expect numerous legal battles
between targets of reports and these sites concerning access to the
identity of tipsters.
Another trend to watch is the relationship between national security
and whistleblowing." 9 In the immediate aftermath of the September
11th attacks and the intelligence and political failures associated with
WMDs in the Iraq war, it appeared as if the American national security
apparatus would embrace a "bottom up" approach to analysis that
encouraged internal dissension-in essence, allowing analysts to "blow
the whistle" on misleading or inaccurate portrayals of intelligence at the
higher levels of decision-making. 2 0 The fallout from the WikiLeaks
scandal, however, appears to have swung the pendulum in the other
direction. 2 ' The Obama administration-perceived to be a friend to
whistleblowers in most contexts-"has been decidedly less emphatic
and more nuanced" in the national security area.122 In the coming years,
we will likely witness a continued battle to find the "sweet spot"
between disclosing enough information to allow national security
decision makers to do their jobs and protecting against unauthorized
disclosure.

119. See Daniel Ellsberg, Secrecy andNational Security Whistleblowing, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Jan. 13, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-ellsberg/secrecy-and-nationalsecu b_2469058.html.
120. It was suggested that the intelligence community would move from a "need to know" to a
"need to share" policy. RICHARD A. BEST JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41848, INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION:

NEED-TO-KNow

VS.

NEED-TO-SHARE

13

(2011),

available

at

http://www.fas.orgsgp/crs/intel/R41848.pdf.
121. Seeid.at 10.
122. Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security
Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 51, 52-53 (2012).
123. BEST, supranote 120, at 1.
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